Intuitive and Explicit in Religious Thought

AbstractIt has been argued within the new cognitive science of religion that people's actual religious concepts and inferences differ from their explicitly held religious concepts and beliefs; the latter are too complex to be used in fast online reasoning. Natural intuitions thus tend to overwr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of cognition and culture 2004, Vol.4 (1), p.123-150
Main Author: Pyysiäinen, Ilkka
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognition
Culture
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES
EXPLICIT CONCEPTS
INTUITIONS
Religion
Sociology
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Summary:AbstractIt has been argued within the new cognitive science of religion that people's actual religious concepts and inferences differ from their explicitly held religious concepts and beliefs; the latter are too complex to be used in fast online reasoning. Natural intuitions thus tend to overwrite theological doctrine and to drive behavior. The cognitive science of religion has focused on this intuitive aspect of religion, ignoring theological thought. Here I try to outline a theoretical model on the basis of which it should be possible to explain the interaction of the intuitive and explicit processes in religious cognition.
ISSN:1567-7095
1568-5373
DOI:10.1163/156853704323074787