Oligopoly Bargaining: Effects of Agreement Pressure and Opponent Strategies

Previous research on oligopoly bargaining has shown soft strategies to be superior to tough strategies and has suggested that this effect may be moderated by agreement pressure. However, previous research is difficult to interpret because the effects of strategy changes and subsequent strategies hav...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of applied social psychology 1990-09, Vol.20 (15), p.1256-1271
Main Authors: Esser, James K., Calvillo, Michael J., Scheel, Michael R., Walker, James L.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Behavior
Business strategies
Perception of others
Sales
Salespeople
Social perception
Social psychology
Social research
Strategic planning
Tactics
Women
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Summary:Previous research on oligopoly bargaining has shown soft strategies to be superior to tough strategies and has suggested that this effect may be moderated by agreement pressure. However, previous research is difficult to interpret because the effects of strategy changes and subsequent strategies have not been adequately tested. Female students from introductory psychology classes were assigned the role of buyers and bargained with initially soft or tough and subsequently soft or tough programmed (seller) strategies under low or high agreement pressure. Subjects had the opportunity to bargain with the strategy (seller) of their choice and to change sellers at any time. As hypothesized, soft seller strategies were found to be superior to tough strategies. In addition, the superiority of soft seller strategies was increased by low agreement pressure.
ISSN:0021-9029
1559-1816
DOI:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1990.tb01471.x