Child labour and resistance to change

We study the interaction between technological innovation, investment in human capital and child labour. In a two-stage game, first firms decide on innovation, then households decide on education. In equilibrium the presence of inefficient child labour depends on parameters related to technology, pa...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economica (London) 2005-08, Vol.72 (287), p.397-411
Main Authors: Bellettini, Giorgio, Berti Ceroni, Carlotta, Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Altruism
Bildungsinvestition
Capitalism
Child labor
Child labour
Economic models
Educational innovation
Games
Human capital
Investition
Investment
Kinderarbeit
Labor
Labor market
Labour economics
Location of enterprises
Mathematical methods
New economic order
Policy analysis
Resistance to change
Studies
Subsidies
Technological change
Technological innovation
Technologische Entwicklung
Theorie
Welfare
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We study the interaction between technological innovation, investment in human capital and child labour. In a two-stage game, first firms decide on innovation, then households decide on education. In equilibrium the presence of inefficient child labour depends on parameters related to technology, parents' altruism and the diffusion of firms' property. Child labour is due either to firms' reluctance to innovate or to households' unwillingness to educate, or both. In some cases, compulsory schooling laws or a ban on child labour are welfare-reducing, whereas a subsidy for innovation is the right tool to eliminate child labour and increase welfare.
ISSN:0013-0427
1468-0335
1468-0335
DOI:10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00422.x