Playing both roles in the trust game

This paper examines the effect of subjects playing both roles in a trust game. We compare two information treatments to our replication of the single-role trust game. The treatments alter the point at which participants are told they will play both roles. We find that playing both roles reduces both...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 2003-06, Vol.51 (2), p.195-216
Main Authors: Burks, Stephen V., Carpenter, Jeffrey P., Verhoogen, Eric
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior
Demographics
Economic behaviour
Economic theory
Economics
Experiment
Game theory
Games
Machiavelli
Norm
Organization theory
Personality
Reciprocity
Role playing
Roles
Studies
Trust
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This paper examines the effect of subjects playing both roles in a trust game. We compare two information treatments to our replication of the single-role trust game. The treatments alter the point at which participants are told they will play both roles. We find that playing both roles reduces both trust and reciprocity. We also explore relationships between demographic and personality characteristics and decisions in the game. We find that a social-psychological measure of Machiavellian behavior predicts distrust but not a lack of trustworthiness, and that non-white participants trust less in a predominantly white environment, but are no less trustworthy.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00093-8