International externalities, strategic interaction, and domestic politics

Domestic politics can sometimes play an influential role when externalities have strategic and international implications. If voters delegate the choice to policymakers and if individual countries independently determine their environmental policy using a consumption tax on the emissions generating...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of environmental economics and management 2003-05, Vol.45 (3), p.674-691
Main Author: Siqueira, Kevin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Domestic policy
Domestic politics
Economic models
Economics
Emissions
Environment
Environmental economics
Environmental policy
Externalities
Externality
International externalities
International system
Politics
Strategic interaction
Studies
Voter behavior
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Domestic politics can sometimes play an influential role when externalities have strategic and international implications. If voters delegate the choice to policymakers and if individual countries independently determine their environmental policy using a consumption tax on the emissions generating good, the result could be an outcome that is inferior to the one preferred by the median voter in the absence of delegation. On the other hand, if the international externality is unilateral in nature, rather than reciprocal, we find that delegation is largely irrelevant, since voters’ choice of policymaker is no longer strategic in character. Similarly, if voters anticipate policymakers successfully coordinating their policies at a later stage, there also will be no difference between the policymakers’ and the median voters’ aggregate weighting of environmental emissions.
ISSN:0095-0696
1096-0449
DOI:10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00023-2