The poverty game and the pension game: The role of reciprocity

We examine the force of the reciprocity norm in gift giving experiments in which mutual gift giving is efficient but gifts are individually costly. Our main result is that we find almost no evidence for reciprocity. Gifts supplied are unrelated to gifts received. This applies equally to the Poverty...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic psychology 1998-02, Vol.19 (1), p.5-41
Main Authors: Van der Heijden, Eline C.M, Nelissen, Jan H.M, Potters, Jan J.M, Verbon, Harrie A.A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied psychology
Biological and medical sciences
Co-operation
Cooperation
Decision making
Economic psychology
Economic theory
Experiments
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Game theory
Gift
Gifts
Matching structure
Miscellaneous
Pensions
Poverty
Psychological aspects
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Reciprocity
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Summary:We examine the force of the reciprocity norm in gift giving experiments in which mutual gift giving is efficient but gifts are individually costly. Our main result is that we find almost no evidence for reciprocity. Gifts supplied are unrelated to gifts received. This applies equally to the Poverty Game (player 1 gives to player 2, player 2 gives to player 1) and the Pension Game (player 2 gives to player 1, player 3 gives to player 2, player 4 gives to player 3, etc.). Nevertheless, we do find substantial levels of gift giving. Furthermore, these levels are higher in the Pension Game than in the Poverty Game. PsycINFO classification: 3020; 3040
ISSN:0167-4870
1872-7719
DOI:10.1016/S0167-4870(97)00035-4