Private risk and public action: The economics of the welfare state

The optimal form of social insurance is discussed, using several models. Two general principles of incentive theory are stated. It is then shown how these apply a simple life-cycle model, a model of intended labour supply, and a model of health and health-care costs. Most attention is devoted to the...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:European economic review 1995-04, Vol.39 (3), p.383-397
Main Author: Mirrlees, J.A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adverse selection
Economic models
Economic theory
Government spending
Health care
Health care policy
Health expenditure
Labour supply
Life cycles
Moral hazard
Optimization
Risk
Social insurance
Social security
Studies
Welfare economics
Welfare state
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The optimal form of social insurance is discussed, using several models. Two general principles of incentive theory are stated. It is then shown how these apply a simple life-cycle model, a model of intended labour supply, and a model of health and health-care costs. Most attention is devoted to the intended-labour-supply model, where random external events cause changes of occupation or family status. The desirability of incomeprogression in the provision of benefits is discussed, and the relationship to other progression in the tax system explored.
ISSN:0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00046-3