RETHINKING RESTRICTIONS ON PLAYER MOBILITY IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

This article considers the possibility that transactions costs and asymmetric income effects have altered the distribution of talent in the aftermath of institutional changes in Major League Baseball. This contradicts the invariance principle of Coase's theorem. Empirical evidence tracking play...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Contemporary economic policy 2002-04, Vol.20 (2), p.145-159
Main Author: Maxcy, Joel G.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Balance theory
Baseball (Professional)
Baseball labor unions
Baseball players
Collective bargaining
Competition
Contract negotiations
Cost benefit analysis
Economic models
Economic theory
Evaluation
Free agency
Labor contracts
Labor market
Labor mobility
Labor relations
Labor unions
Labour mobility
Management
Policy studies
Professional baseball
Property rights
Sports
Statistical analysis
Studies
Transaction costs
U.S.A
United States
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This article considers the possibility that transactions costs and asymmetric income effects have altered the distribution of talent in the aftermath of institutional changes in Major League Baseball. This contradicts the invariance principle of Coase's theorem. Empirical evidence tracking player movement and competitive balance over the past 50 years conclusively supports these stands. Free agency, when permitted to proceed with limited intereference, has increased the rate that productive players transfer and has also improved some measures of competitive balance. Competitive balance is also shown to have improved with the implementation of the draft. Policy prescriptions calling for increased restrictions on player mobility are ill advised.
ISSN:1074-3529
1465-7287
DOI:10.1093/cep/20.2.145