Reasoning and the Weighting of Attributes in Attitude Judgments

Two experiments examined processes by which analyzing reasons may influence attitude judgments. Participants made multiple liking judgments on sets of stimuli that varied along 6 a priori dimensions. In Study 1, the stimulus set consisted of 64 cartoon faces with 6 binary-valued attributes (e.g., a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of personality and social psychology 1996-02, Vol.70 (2), p.230-240
Main Authors: Levine, Gary M, Halberstadt, Jamin B, Goldstone, Robert L
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Attitudes
Attributes
Behavior. Attitude
Biological and medical sciences
Cognition & reasoning
Decision making
Experiments
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Human
Judgement
Judgment
Judgments
Physical Appearance
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Reasoning
Social cognition
Social psychology
Weighting
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Summary:Two experiments examined processes by which analyzing reasons may influence attitude judgments. Participants made multiple liking judgments on sets of stimuli that varied along 6 a priori dimensions. In Study 1, the stimulus set consisted of 64 cartoon faces with 6 binary-valued attributes (e.g., a straight vs. a crooked nose). In Study 2, the stimuli were 60 digitized photographs from a college yearbook that varied along 6 dimensions uncovered through multidimensional scaling. In each experiment, half of the participants were instructed to think about the reasons why they liked each face before making their liking rating. Participants' multiple liking ratings were then regressed on the dimension values to determine how they weighted each dimension in their liking judgments. The results support a process whereby reasoning leads to increased variability and inconsistency in the weighting of stimulus information. Wilson's model of the disruptive effects of reasoning on attitude judgments (e.g., T. D. Wilson, D. S. Dunn, D. Kraft, & D. J. Lisle, 1989 ) is discussed.
ISSN:0022-3514
1939-1315
DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.70.2.230