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Internet resiliency to attacks and failures under BGP policy routing

We investigate the resiliency of the Internet at the Autonomous System (AS) level to failures and attacks, under the real constraint of business agreements between the ASs. The agreements impose policies that govern routing in the AS level, and thus the resulting topology graph is directed, and thus...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Computer networks (Amsterdam, Netherlands : 1999) Netherlands : 1999), 2006-11, Vol.50 (16), p.3183-3196
Main Authors: Dolev, Danny, Jamin, Sugih, Mokryn, Osnat (Ossi), Shavitt, Yuval
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:We investigate the resiliency of the Internet at the Autonomous System (AS) level to failures and attacks, under the real constraint of business agreements between the ASs. The agreements impose policies that govern routing in the AS level, and thus the resulting topology graph is directed, and thus the reachability between Ases is not transitive. We show, using partial views obtained from the Internet, that the Internet’s resiliency to a deliberate attack is much smaller than previously found, and its reachability is also somewhat lower under random failures. We use different metrics to measure resiliency, and also investigate the effect of added backup connectivity on the resiliency.
ISSN:1389-1286
1872-7069
DOI:10.1016/j.comnet.2005.11.010