Simultaneous Over- and Underconfidence: The Role of Error in Judgment Processes

Two empirical judgment phenomena appear to contradict each other. In the revision-of-opinion literature, subjective probability (SP) judgments have been analyzed as a function of objective probability (OP) and generally have been found to be conservative, that is, to represent underconfidence. In th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychological review 1994-07, Vol.101 (3), p.519-527
Main Authors: Erev, Ido, Wallsten, Thomas S, Budescu, David V
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Biological and medical sciences
Cognition & reasoning
Cognition. Intelligence
Confidence Calibrations
Conservatism
Decision Making
Errors
Evaluative Thinking
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Human
Judgement
Judgment
Judgments
Literature Reviews
Overconfidence
Probability
Probability Judgment
Processes
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Reasoning. Problem solving
Revision Processes
Role
Social research
Theory Practice Relationship
Uncertainty
Underconfidence
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Summary:Two empirical judgment phenomena appear to contradict each other. In the revision-of-opinion literature, subjective probability (SP) judgments have been analyzed as a function of objective probability (OP) and generally have been found to be conservative, that is, to represent underconfidence. In the calibration literature, analyses of OP (operationalized as relative frequency correct) as a function of SP have led to the opposite conclusion, that judgment is generally overconfident. The authors reanalyze 3 studies and show that both results can be obtained from the same set of data, depending on the method of analysis. The simultaneous effects are then generated and factors influencing them are explored by means of a model that instantiates a very general theory of how SP estimates arise from true judgments perturbed by random error. Theoretical and practical implications of the work are discussed.
ISSN:0033-295X
1939-1471
DOI:10.1037/0033-295X.101.3.519