Some notes concerning Dr. Fodor's 'Reflections on L. S. Vygotsky's Thought and language'

• Published in: Cognition 1972-01, Vol.1 (2/3), p.311-316
• Main Authors: Leontev, A N, Luriya, A R
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• ISSN: 0010-0277

A reply to a critical review (See LLBA VI/4, abstract #7205042.). Although Fodor makes some very good points in his discussion of some basic problems in the contemporary approach to psychology, it is necessary to disagree with some of his statements. In response to Fodor's claim that Vygotsky "started from a priori assumptions," an explanation of his approach is made and it is pointed out that his speculations are supported by experimental work. In support of Vygotsky, the works of D. O. Hebb, who in describing the most complex cognitive basis of language processes has rendered any hypothesis on its "innate" origin untenable, are called upon. Vygotsky presumed that conscious (or cognitive) processes have a socio-historical issue, and that language is narrowly related to every conscious reflection of reality. Fodor's arguments against the idea that "the meaning of the words evolve" are weak. It is not true that mutual understanding is possible only if meanings are identical. A word always desigates an object (quality, action, or relation), and a common designation suffices for mutual understanding. Insofar as the basic essense of an adult's thought is concerned, it is pointed out that Vygotsky thought of his method of classification blocks simply as a model to demonstrate the qualitative stages of the basic forms of generalization which change during the child's mental development. Total agreement is shown with Fodor's statement that thinking depends on the purposes which it serves. It was clearly demonstrated how man's motives and purposes result in new forms of activity, how actions and operations are acquired, and how the most complex unit of a child's personality is formed. Vygotsky's contribution to psychology is much greater than what is contained in Thought and language. Fodor's assumption that the development of the basic forms of thinking depends, to a great extent, on goals, purposes, and real tasks, fully concords with all that has been said by Soviet psychologists in recent decades.