MUNICIPAL REGULATION AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY

An attempt is made to establish a simpler economic paradigm for determining municipal antitrust liability than that used presently. The current municipal ''state action'' exemption simultaneously overextends federal power in areas more properly reserved to the state and underuses...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:UCLA law review 1985-04, Vol.32 (4), p.719-783
Main Authors: Hovenkamp, Herbert, Mackerron, John A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Antitrust
Economics
Efficiency
Exemptions
Federal and municipal relations
Federal legislation
Legal aspects
Legislation
Liability
Municipal government
Municipal liability
Municipalities
Regulation
Sherman Antitrust Act 1890-US
States
Supreme Court decisions
Trusts, Industrial
United States
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Summary:An attempt is made to establish a simpler economic paradigm for determining municipal antitrust liability than that used presently. The current municipal ''state action'' exemption simultaneously overextends federal power in areas more properly reserved to the state and underuses federal power in areas in which federal interests should be foremost. Also, the state action doctrine has forced the federal courts to look for state legislative intent to displace the federal antitrust laws. A more common sense approach is to recognize that there are some markets for which local governments are the proper regulators, and these should be identified by federal, not state, law. Once municipal regulation is held to run afoul of federal antitrust policy, that inconsistency should be seen in a ''preemption'' rather than an ''exemption'' paradigm. The recently passed ''Boulder Bill'' is examined.
ISSN:0041-5650
1943-1724