Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis

Does vigorous electoral competition help to convert citizens' preferences into government action? No, concludes a series of theoretical and empirical studies conducted over the last 35 years. If these findings are correct, efforts to enhance competition such as depoliticizing the redistricting...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2006-11, Vol.68 (4), p.911-921
Main Author: Griffin, John D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Competitiveness
Congressional districts
Constituency
Electoral Systems
Incumbents
Legislators
Liberalism
Marginalization
Political candidates
Political parties
Political Representation
Preferences
Presidential elections
Public Policy
Voting
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Summary:Does vigorous electoral competition help to convert citizens' preferences into government action? No, concludes a series of theoretical and empirical studies conducted over the last 35 years. If these findings are correct, efforts to enhance competition such as depoliticizing the redistricting process and achieving greater equity in campaign spending, while perhaps beneficial in other respects, will not improve government responsiveness. However, these studies are limited by a shortage of data, by biased measures of district competitiveness, and by their conceptualization of responsiveness. Using both cross-sectional and fixed-effects modeling frameworks, this study finds that in recent years elected officials who represent more competitive districts are indeed more responsive to their constituents' preferences.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00479.x