Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies

This article examines why some democracies and semi-democracies develop relatively stable party systems, while others continue to be roiled by high levels of electoral volatility. It is the first broadly cross-regional analysis of electoral volatility, and it is based on the most extensive data asse...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Party politics 2007-03, Vol.13 (2), p.155-178
Main Authors: Mainwaring, Scott, Zoco, Edurne
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Competitiveness
Critical path analysis
Cross-national analysis
Democracy
Democratization
Election results
Elections
Electoral volatility
Party systems
Path Dependence
Political Parties
Political science
Political stability
Sequences
Social Sciences
Stability
Stabilization
Volatility
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Summary:This article examines why some democracies and semi-democracies develop relatively stable party systems, while others continue to be roiled by high levels of electoral volatility. It is the first broadly cross-regional analysis of electoral volatility, and it is based on the most extensive data assembled on electoral volatility. Our most original finding is that competitive regimes inaugurated in earlier periods have much lower electoral volatility than regimes inaugurated more recently, even controlling for a variety of other factors that have been hypothesized to affect electoral volatility. Parties had very different functions according to when democracy was inaugurated, and these congenital differences had longterm effects on the stabilization of party competition. What matters for the stabilization of party competition is when democracy was born, not how old it is. Our results support social science approaches that emphasize historical sequences and path dependence.
ISSN:1354-0688
1460-3683
DOI:10.1177/1354068807073852