Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment

Proponents of Approval Voting argue that this electoral rule leads to more centrist outcomes compared to Plurality Voting. This claim has been substantiated by scholarly work using spatial models of political competition. We revisit this issue in the context of a model of political competition in wh...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2007-09, Vol.29 (2), p.229-245
Main Authors: Dellis, Arnaud, Oak, Mandar
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Alternative voting
Candidates
Competition
Economic competition
Elections
Lotteries
Majority voting
Plurality voting
Policy
Policy making
Political candidates
Political elections
Political partisanship
Political science
Politics
Social Choice
Studies
Traditions
Voters
Voting
Voting Behavior
Voting paradox
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Summary:Proponents of Approval Voting argue that this electoral rule leads to more centrist outcomes compared to Plurality Voting. This claim has been substantiated by scholarly work using spatial models of political competition. We revisit this issue in the context of a model of political competition in which (1) candidates are policy-motivated; (2) candidacy decisions are endogenous; and (3) candidates can credibly commit to implementing any policy. Under these assumptions we find the opposite to be true-Plurality Voting yields convergence to the median voter's ideal policy but Approval Voting may not. We argue that this result is driven by the differential incentives for candidate entry under the two voting rules. Our results suggest that whether Approval Voting yields more centrist outcomes vis-á-vis Plurality Voting depends on the possibility of policy commitment on the part of the candidates.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2