The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships: Why Rivals Do Not Overcome Suspicion Step by Step

• Published in: Political science quarterly 2007-06, Vol.122 (2), p.287-312
• Main Author: HOFFMAN, AARON M.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Analysis; Case studies; Collectives; Community relations; Conflict management; Cooperation; Councils; Decision Making; Europe; European Community; European Community law; European Council; European history; European Union; Exploitation; Governance; Government; Government crises; International cooperation; International relations; Kidnapping; Methods; Peace process; Political action committees; Political alliances; Political science; Pressure; Treaties; Treaty of Rome; Trust; Voting
• ISSN: 0032-3195; 1538-165X
• DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00600.x

Trusting relationships emerge when suspicious parties limit the consequences of exploitation. Governments will not transfer control over their interests to others if doing so creates a significant risk of domination by former rivals or loss of political office to internal opponents. These dangers can be reduced by designing institutions that guarantee potential trustors the ability to influence collective choices ("effective voice") and that enable leaders to make decisions without undermining their standing among their supporters ("breathing space"). Here, Hoffman examines the plausibility of the aforestated argument through a case study of governance in the European Community (EC), from the 1957 Treaty of Rome to the signing of the Single European Act in 1986. The study suggests a conclusion that successful trust-building strategies tackle the hardest issues first, through the provision of rules and procedures that enable actors to reliably influence and defend their core interests and that shield leaders from domestic political pressures.