Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information

We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of conflict resolution 2007-10, Vol.51 (5), p.793-818
Main Authors: Levati, M. Vittoria, Sutter, Matthias, van der Heijden, Eline
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior modeling
Behavioral Sciences
Conflict
Conflict resolution
Cooperation
Endowment
Endowments
Epistemology
Experiments
Fairness
Game theory
Group Activities
Group behaviour
Group dynamics
Groups
Income distribution
Influences
Interest
International relations
Leaders
Leadership
Leadership Styles
Participation
Political science
Procedural justice
Prosocial Behavior
Public good
Public goods
Public Sector
Rotation
Sharing Behavior
Social exclusion
Social Influences
Social psychology
Social sciences
Studies
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Summary:We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do not know the distribution of endowments. Granting the leaders exclusion power does not lead to significantly higher contributions.
ISSN:0022-0027
1552-8766
DOI:10.1177/0022002707302796