Electoral Risk and Redistributive Politics in Mexico and the United States

What strategy does a rational party follow in allocating discretionary expenditure? This article conceives redistributive politics as an investment strategy where expenditure allocations respond to electoral risk. To show the effects of risk, it provides evidence from Pronasol in Mexico and an analy...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Studies in comparative international development 2008-06, Vol.43 (2), p.129-150
Main Author: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budgetary policy
Comparative analysis
Diversification
Elections
Electoral volatility
Expenditures
Hegemony
Highway construction
Income redistribution
Incumbency
Investment
Investment policy
Mexico
New Deal
Political influences
Political Parties
Political science
Politicians
Public expenditure
Social Sciences
U.S.A
United States of America
Voters
Welfare
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Summary:What strategy does a rational party follow in allocating discretionary expenditure? This article conceives redistributive politics as an investment strategy where expenditure allocations respond to electoral risk. To show the effects of risk, it provides evidence from Pronasol in Mexico and an analysis of New Deal spending in the United States. The analysis finds that the federal administrations in both countries responded to systematic electoral risk. Spending diversification into risky voters was a rational response to chances of losing elections. The analysis hence connects electoral volatility with redistributive spending.
ISSN:0039-3606
1936-6167
DOI:10.1007/s12116-008-9020-1