"No Statement Is Immune to Revision"

The pragmatist claim by W. V. O. Quine (From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1953) & M. White (Toward Reunion in Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1956) of universal revisability, which attacks rationalism & empiricalism, is examined. The pragmatists contend that e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social research 1977-01, Vol.44 (4), p.801-823
Main Author: NELL, EDWARD J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
A priori knowledge
Analyticity
Bachelors
Criminal sentencing
Empiricism
Empiricism/Empiricist
Epistemology
Logical truth
Philosophy/Philosophies/ Philosophical
Pragmatism
Pragmatism/Pragmatic/Pragmatist
Predicates
Rational/Rationalist/ Rationalistic/ Rationalism
Rationality
Revisionism/Revisionist/ Revisionists
Social research
Statement/Statements
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Summary:The pragmatist claim by W. V. O. Quine (From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1953) & M. White (Toward Reunion in Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1956) of universal revisability, which attacks rationalism & empiricalism, is examined. The pragmatists contend that experience is unlimited & that no analytic/synthetic distinction can be made. Instead, statements of truth are to be chosen temporarily without dictates of language or logic & revised as necessary. Since every statement can be revised a priori, knowledge does not exist. The question, however, is raised of the revisability of Quine's & White's statement, resulting in an analysis of self-applicability & special status of a statement. The discussion emphasizes (in opposition to Quine & White) the importance of reason for establishing truths. Although the empiricists have an unacceptable explanation of epistemology, which places man in a receiver rather than actor role, the pragmatists, too, are criticized for not admitting that only through reason can man make decisions which will be in his self-interest. Man, however, does not decide the nature of rationality & therefore, statements which describe rationality are not revisable. J. Massey.
ISSN:0037-783X