Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy

This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Our argument is that electoral rules facilitated party dominance through two mechanisms: electoral rules disproportionately rewarded existing majorities and, at the same time, discouraged potential m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of theoretical politics 2001-07, Vol.13 (3), p.271-293
Main Authors: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Magaloni, Beatriz
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Democracy
Democratization
Design
Elections
Electoral systems
Mexico
Party systems
Political Development
Political institutions
Political Parties
Political Systems
Political theory
Ruling parties
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Summary:This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Our argument is that electoral rules facilitated party dominance through two mechanisms: electoral rules disproportionately rewarded existing majorities and, at the same time, discouraged potential majorities from forming. More specifically, the rules rewarded parties that could win a majority of the vote in single-member districts; but at the same time, rewarded minority parties with seats from multi-member districts, mitigating Duvergerian incentives to coordinate behind a single challenger. In the short run, seats from multi-member districts benefited opposition parties by significantly reducing entry costs; in the long run, however, these seats helped sustain party dominance, by discouraging coordination among opposition parties and voters.
ISSN:0951-6298
1460-3667
DOI:10.1177/095169280101300303