Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork

Recent research has uncovered a majority party advantage in the allocation of federal resources, a relationship seemingly at odds with the bipartisan support often enjoyed by distributive policies and programs. We reconcile this disjuncture by developing a partisan blame avoidance account of the dis...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2002-07, Vol.46 (3), p.515-525
Main Authors: Balla, Steven J., Lawrence, Eric D., Maltzman, Forrest, Sigelman, Lee
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Congressional districts
Earmarks
Government Spending
Government waste
Higher Education
Legislative behaviour
Legislative Bodies
Legislators
Legislatures
Partisanship
Party politics
Patronage
Political behavior
Political Parties
Political partisanship
Political science
Pork
Public expenditure
Senators
U.S.A
United States Senate
Upper houses
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Summary:Recent research has uncovered a majority party advantage in the allocation of federal resources, a relationship seemingly at odds with the bipartisan support often enjoyed by distributive policies and programs. We reconcile this disjuncture by developing a partisan blame avoidance account of the distribution of legislative pork. According to this account, the majority party inoculates itself against minority party charges of wasteful spending by including the minority in pork barrel coalitions. At the same time, the majority party, mindful of the electoral benefits of bringing home the bacon, reserves the most valuable awards for its members. We assess this account by examining the awarding of appropriations earmarks to institutions of higher education between 1995 and 2000. The partisan blame avoidance account is supported.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.2307/3088396