Through Thick and Thin: Validity and Reflective Judgment

The application of "thick" ethical concepts is best understood as a process of reflective rather than deductive judgment. Taking the form "B is as X as A," where X is a thick ethical concept and A and B are narrative wholes unified through X (for example, "Those who hid Jews...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Hypatia 2005-07, Vol.20 (3), p.115-126
Main Author: FLAKNE, APRIL
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Arendt, Hannah
Beauty
Blasphemy
Courage
Ethical epistemology
Ethics
Final causes
Judgment
Kant, Immanuel
Legal ethics
Literary criticism
Moody-Adams, Michele
Moral Judgment
Moral relativism
Morality
Philosophers
Philosophy
Political Philosophy
Politics
Reflexivity
Social conditions & trends
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Summary:The application of "thick" ethical concepts is best understood as a process of reflective rather than deductive judgment. Taking the form "B is as X as A," where X is a thick ethical concept and A and B are narrative wholes unified through X (for example, "Those who hid Jews from the Nazis were as brave as Achilles"), reflective judgment opens thick ethical concepts to transformation. Though interpretive, such reflective judgment may still be able to provide validity without recourse to "thin," purportedly context-neutral terms.
ISSN:0887-5367
1527-2001
DOI:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2005.tb00489.x