Trusting in reason

The claims of reason, whether descriptive or prescriptive, should be viewed as universal. There are different ways & methods designed to enable a grasp of rationality, but there is no coherent way of designing escape from rationality. Ethics no more collapses into science than science collapases...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Critical review of international social and political philosophy 2001-12, Vol.4 (4), p.1-34
Main Author: King, Preston
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ethics
Irrationality
Pluralism
Rationality
Reasoning
Relativism
Theoretical Problems
Universalism
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Summary:The claims of reason, whether descriptive or prescriptive, should be viewed as universal. There are different ways & methods designed to enable a grasp of rationality, but there is no coherent way of designing escape from rationality. Ethics no more collapses into science than science collapases into ethics. Hence, the logic of 'is' & 'ought' diverge, but without prejudice to the rationality of either. Moral theory as distinct from scientific theory is often perceived to be irrational (hence emotivists, naturalists, & relativists). An important dimension of this supposed irrationality lies in the characterization of universalism as anti-pluralist, & pluralism as relativism. One good reason why this characterization fails is because the contradictory of pluralism is absolutism, not universalism, & because pluralism contains significant claims that prove both coherent & apt, morally & politically. 1 Figure. Adapted from the source document.
ISSN:1369-8230
1743-8772
DOI:10.1080/13698230108403362