A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership

• Published in: The journal of political philosophy 2004-03, Vol.12 (1), p.65-78
• Main Author: Taylor, Robert S.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Autonomy; Coercion; Ethics; Kant, Immanuel; Law; Morals; Ownership; Philosophy; Political science; Political theory
• ISSN: 0963-8016; 1467-9760
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00191.x

Argues that a Kantian defense of self-ownership is possible by looking at Kant's thought on it as found in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1997 [1785]) & Metaphysics of Morals (1996 [1797]) & by providing two Kantian defenses based on the 1st (Universal Law) & 3rd (Autonomy) Formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Kant's own rejection of self-ownership is addressed before considering arguments in favor of a "duty of physical noninterference," which is seen as a universal perfect duty. The Universal Law argument is considered via an examination of the Exploitation Maxim & Paternalism Maxim, versions of the physical coercion maxim, showing that neither can be successfully universalized for they involve a contradiction in conception. The Autonomy argument is then developed in three stages: moral practice, moral intuition, & moral principle. It is found that physical coercion of rational agents involves a profound status wrong; ie, the treatment of rational agents as animals or children. This system of differential status, & related differential treatment, can be morally justified by taking the Kantian perspective on man's nature as a self-legislating being. It is asserted that Kant's peaceful international order can be seen as an extension of self-ownership. J. Zendejas