Bureaucratic Tenure and Economic Performance in Centrally Planned Economies

Murrell and Olson (1991) set forth the hypothesis that in centrally planned economies economic interests over time become fragmented as bureaus become more autonomous and form into narrowly-based distributional coalitions. As a consequence, the national leader's encompassing interest in economi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 1995-04, Vol.83 (1/2), p.139-157
Main Authors: Faith, Roger L., Short, Nancy C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bureaucracy
Central Europe
Centrally planned economies
Coefficients
Collective action
Decision making
Eastern Europe
Economic conditions
Economic growth
Economic growth models
Economic growth rate
Economic performance
Economic Policy
Economic resources
ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
ECONOMICS
Efficiency
Foreign Affairs
GROWTH (ALL TYPES)
Hypotheses
Interest groups
INVESTMENT
Managers
Market economies
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, NONEXECUTIVE
Planned economies
Planned economy
Planning
Political interest groups
Political leadership
Rent seeking behavior
Rent-seeking
Tenure
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Summary:Murrell and Olson (1991) set forth the hypothesis that in centrally planned economies economic interests over time become fragmented as bureaus become more autonomous and form into narrowly-based distributional coalitions. As a consequence, the national leader's encompassing interest in economic growth becomes compromised and growth begins to slow. This paper provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that growing bureaucratic autonomy results in declining economic growth in centrally planned economies.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/BF01047689