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Czar Rule in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies?

We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yield...

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Published in:	Legislative studies quarterly 1996-02, Vol.21 (1), p.5-40
Main Authors:	Myagkov, Mikhail G., Kiewiet, D. Roderick
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Agenda Ambivalence Bloc voting BORIS YELTSIN CONFLICT Congress Congressional committees Congressional voting CONSTITUTIONS CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA Government Legislatures Modeling PUBLIC POLICY Russia Tsars Voter turnout Voting Voting patterns
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container_title	Legislative studies quarterly
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creator	Myagkov, Mikhail G. Kiewiet, D. Roderick
description	We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yields several testable hypotheses. The model receives some empirical backing, but overall the results of our analyses do not support it. We therefore attribute the conflict between the Yeltsin government and the RCPD to fundamental disagreements over policy and not to internal contradictions in constitutional design.
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identifier	ISSN: 0362-9805
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source	JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects	Agenda Ambivalence Bloc voting BORIS YELTSIN CONFLICT Congress Congressional committees Congressional voting CONSTITUTIONS CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA Government Legislatures Modeling PUBLIC POLICY Russia Tsars Voter turnout Voting Voting patterns
title	Czar Rule in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies?
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