Democratic accountability and central bank independence: Historical and contemporary, national and European perspectives

Recently there has been a general move towards greater central bank independence in Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France and Spain have all increased the autonomy of their respective central banks. In this context, some people have argued that the prospects for democratic, representati...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:West European politics 1998-07, Vol.21 (3), p.53-76
Main Author: Elgie, Robert
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Bank of England
Banking
Banking sector
BANKING, BANKS
Banque de France
Central banks
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE
Democracy
Europe
European central bank
European Union
FRANCE
Government
GREAT BRITAIN
Historical analysis
Independence
Monetary policy
MONETARY POLICY & ECONOMICS
Policy making
Political history
Self-government
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Summary:Recently there has been a general move towards greater central bank independence in Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France and Spain have all increased the autonomy of their respective central banks. In this context, some people have argued that the prospects for democratic, representative government have been weakened. In these countries, democratically elected governments can no longer control the process of monetary policy making. By constructing an index of central banks' independence, this article shows that the recent moves towards central bank independence in Britain and France have not challenged the basic foundations of indirect political accountability. However, it also shows that the proposed institutional architecture of the European Central Bank is a departure from the norms of political accountability and that, in this case, there is a distinct 'democratic deficit' which needs to be addressed.
ISSN:0140-2382
1743-9655
DOI:10.1080/01402389808425257