Moral Autonomy and the Rationality of Science

The few extant arguments concerning the autonomy of science in the rational acceptance of hypotheses are examined. It is concluded that science is not morally autonomous, and that the attendant notion of rationality in science decisionmaking is inadequate. A more comprehensive notion of scientific r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 1977-12, Vol.44 (4), p.513-541
Main Author: Gaa, James C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Autonomous/Autonomy
Decision theory
Ethic/Ethics/Ethical
Ethical behavior
Generally accepted auditing standards
Logic/Logical/Logicians
Moral judgment
Moral/Morals
Morality
Philosophy of science
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Science/Sciences (see also Scientific)
Scientific ethics
Social ethics
Special Section on Value Issues in Science, Technology, and Medicine
Value judgments
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Summary:The few extant arguments concerning the autonomy of science in the rational acceptance of hypotheses are examined. It is concluded that science is not morally autonomous, and that the attendant notion of rationality in science decisionmaking is inadequate. A more comprehensive notion of scientific rationality, which encompasses the old one, is proposed as a replacement. The general idea is that scientists qua scientist ought, in their acceptance decisions, to take into account the ethical consequences of acceptance as well as the consequences with regard to the attainment of "purely scientific" or "epistemic" objectives. The result constitutes an argument for a (presumably cooperative) game theoretic treatment of inductive logic.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/288767