Natural Rationality: A Neglected Concept in the Social Sciences

• Published in: Philosophy of the social sciences 1976-06, Vol.6 (2), p.115-126
• Main Author: Barnes, S.B.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Concept/Concepts/Conception/Conceptual/ Conceptualization; Nature/Natural/Naturalism/ Naturalistic; Rational/Rationalist/ Rationalistic/ Rationalism; Social science/Social sciences/Social scientific
• ISSN: 0048-3931; 1552-7441
• DOI: 10.1177/004839317600600202

Naturalistic & evaluative conceptions of rationality are outlined & contrasted; it is the former which should guide research in the social sciences but the latter frequently is erroneously employed in its stead. Sociological & anthropological literature do little to explicate the natural processes of reasoning & cognition. Either confidence is placed in intuitions & biases that may impinge upon the map of 'rationality', or philosophical views are cited to justify certain beliefs as knowledge. The distinction between naturalistic & evaluative concepts of rationality, as based on culturally defined conventions, is not considered in the work of most social scientists. The way in which different sociological models of naturalistic rationality generate widely divergent sociological implications is considered. Sociological implications of the usage of one possible account of natural rationality--the tolerant theory of M. Hesse (THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE, London, England: 1974)--are discussed as offering a plausible alternative to current theorizing. Modified AA.