Thinking of Individuals

The model of thinking that conceives it as "talking to oneself silently," & that dates back to Plato is mistaken. The error is particularly glaring as the function of reference is considered. Three assumptions are made: (1) reference is an element of speech-acts, so that it is primaril...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Indiana), 1976-03, Vol.10 (1), p.35-46
Main Author: Vendler, Zeno
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Children
Communication/Communications/ Communicative/ Communicating/ Communicator/ Communicational
Definite descriptions
Employment
Gestures
Individual/Individuals/ Individualism/ Individuality/ Individualistic/ Individualization/ Individualize
Language/Languages
Letter writing
Life history
Mind
Names
Numbers
Numerals
Proper names
Spinach
Thinking
Thought
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Summary:The model of thinking that conceives it as "talking to oneself silently," & that dates back to Plato is mistaken. The error is particularly glaring as the function of reference is considered. Three assumptions are made: (1) reference is an element of speech-acts, so that it is primarily people (not words, phrases, or sentences) that do the referring, (2) people use conventional linguistic media, eg, proper names, pronouns, descriptions, gestures, etc, which accomplish the purpose of the referring act, & (3) the act of reference may succeed or fail, regardless of the adequacy of the speaker's performance. Since none of these factors can apply to the process of thinking about one individual thing or another, it follows that there is no reference in thought. In talking, it is necessary to indicate overtly who or what is meant, but no such indication is necessary to make oneself understand what is being thought about. In asking what makes thinking about an individual called a thinking about a, the solutions of Wittgenstein, represented in N. Malcolm, are considered ("Wittgenstein on the Nature of Mind," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1970, Monograph 4, Oxford, 9-29). The problem is: what connects the thought to the thing thought about? Malcolm's solution, that we should look around us at the context at which our words are pointing is rejected; we should look inside ourselves first, in search of the associations that link our thought to its intended subject. To be able to think of a certain individual, we must recall his/her introduction into our life history, which serves as a private token (or memory or image), identifying him/her & enabling us to think that individual. S. Karganovic.
ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI:10.2307/2214473