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Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions
The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress - whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most closely correspond to their constituents' interests - has implications for theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question...
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| Published in: | Public choice 1994-12, Vol.81 (3/4), p.195-221 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c512t-afdb06f4e4342fb78ac7e86da9e3377aa22489e0917234b86189acfbc88c83a53 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c512t-afdb06f4e4342fb78ac7e86da9e3377aa22489e0917234b86189acfbc88c83a53 |
| container_end_page | 221 |
| container_issue | 3/4 |
| container_start_page | 195 |
| container_title | Public choice |
| container_volume | 81 |
| creator | Coker, David C. Crain, W. Mark |
| description | The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress - whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most closely correspond to their constituents' interests - has implications for theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question a categorical self-selection process, in this paper we present a theory of committee function based on loyalty to party leaders. As a rationale for leadership privilege, and to provide context for our argument, we first present a theoretical framework based on a modified model of cooperation. We then focus on certain specifics of our leadership theory; that rank-and-file members vote leadership interests in exchange for leader support in gaining choice committee assignments and aid in passing legislation. This leads to predictions about voting patterns across committees. Static tests of these relations are performed, as well as those incorporating changes in voting patterns with seniority. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF01053230 |
| format | article |
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Mark</creatorcontrib><title>Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions</title><title>Public choice</title><description>The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress - whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most closely correspond to their constituents' interests - has implications for theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question a categorical self-selection process, in this paper we present a theory of committee function based on loyalty to party leaders. As a rationale for leadership privilege, and to provide context for our argument, we first present a theoretical framework based on a modified model of cooperation. We then focus on certain specifics of our leadership theory; that rank-and-file members vote leadership interests in exchange for leader support in gaining choice committee assignments and aid in passing legislation. 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| ispartof | Public choice, 1994-12, Vol.81 (3/4), p.195-221 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
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| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ABI/INFORM global; EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; Social Science Premium Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; Politics Collection; Sociology Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Springer Online Journal Archives; JSTOR Journals and Primary Sources |
| subjects | Bias CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT Committees Congress Congressional committees Cooperation Leadership Legislation LEGISLATIVE BODIES Legislative process Legislators Loyalty MODELING, MODELS Organizational analysis Party leadership Political institutions Political parties Political support Preferences Seniority Standing committees Statistical variance THEORY BUILDING OR THEORETICAL APPROACH U.S.A United States VOTING |
| title | Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions |
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