Loosened Partisan Attachments and Receptivity to Incumbent Behaviors: A Panel Analysis, 1972-1976

An established hypothesis explaining the increased incumbency advantage is that incumbents reaped the benefit of the reduction in partisan identification's influence on the congressional vote. Briefly, the hypothesis maintains that as partisan identification's influence waned incumbent beh...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political research quarterly 1994-03, Vol.47 (1), p.177-192
Main Authors: Romero, David W., Sanders, Francine
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behaviorism
Candidates
Cohort studies
Congressional elections
Governors
Identifiers
Incumbent
Incumbents
Partisan
Political parties
Political partisanship
Public officials
Standard deviation
United States
Voter behavior
Voting
Voting behavior
Voting behaviour
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Summary:An established hypothesis explaining the increased incumbency advantage is that incumbents reaped the benefit of the reduction in partisan identification's influence on the congressional vote. Briefly, the hypothesis maintains that as partisan identification's influence waned incumbent behavior's influence increased. The increased incumbency advantage is then the result of incumbents actively attracting voters whose decision is based less on partisan considerations and more on what incumbents offer. Using the 1972-76 NES panel study, we test this hypothesis by examining incumbent behavior's influence on voters with loosened partisan identification. The results support this premise. The interaction between incumbent behaviors and loosened partisan identification increases the probability of an incumbent vote, attracting loosened challenger party identifiers and retaining loosened incumbent party identifiers. Finally, the results suggest that higher levels of incumbent activity increase the probability of an incumbent vote.
ISSN:1065-9129
1938-274X
DOI:10.1177/106591299404700109