Preemptive Strike: Central Bank Reform in Chile's Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Under what conditions do exiting autoritarian elites use institutions to fend off the threat of democracy? One way to execute institutional insulation is to make the central bank autonomous from elected officials. Central bank autonomy both removes a key aspect of economic decision making from democ...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative politics 1998-07, Vol.30 (4), p.443-462
Main Author: Boylan, Delia M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authoritarianism
Banking
Banking sector
BANKING, BANKS
Central banks
Chile
Democracy
Economic policy
Economic reform
Elite
Government and politics
Insulation
Macroeconomic stability
Military government
Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto
Political change
Political freedom
Political reform
POLITICAL STABILITY, INSTABILITY, & CHANGE
Politicians
Politics
Reform
REFORM, REFORMERS
Reforms
Regime transition
Transition
Transition economies
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Summary:Under what conditions do exiting autoritarian elites use institutions to fend off the threat of democracy? One way to execute institutional insulation is to make the central bank autonomous from elected officials. Central bank autonomy both removes a key aspect of economic decision making from democratic control and constrains governments to pursue neoliberal policies. Where authoritarian elites know a regime change is imminent and fear a populist outcome, as in Chile in 1989, they can be expected to create an autonomous central bank to tie the hands of successor governments.
ISSN:0010-4159
2151-6227
DOI:10.2307/422333