Heuristic coordination games: rational action equilibrium and objective social constraints in a linguistic conception of rationality

The author's linguistic conception of rationality (see SA 40:1/92Y2399) is used to derive a concept of rational-action equilibrium. The equilibrium concept is evolutionary & game-theoretic, based on evolutionarily stable strategies in sociobiology. According to the linguistic conception, ra...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social Science Information 1992-12, Vol.31 (4), p.711-734
Main Author: McCain, Roger A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Means-Ends Rationality
Rational Choice
Rational Decision
Rational expectations
Rationality
Social Factors
Social Science
Social systems
Values
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Summary:The author's linguistic conception of rationality (see SA 40:1/92Y2399) is used to derive a concept of rational-action equilibrium. The equilibrium concept is evolutionary & game-theoretic, based on evolutionarily stable strategies in sociobiology. According to the linguistic conception, rationality can be expressed in rationales, each of which has a three-part structure reasoning from (1) a value premise by way of (2) an assertion of fact to (3) an imperative conclusion. It is assumed that the evolutionary process eliminates rationales in which part 2 fails in rather simple empirical ways or part 1 expresses a value judgment to which people in general are not committed, if there is an alternative that passes the same test. Some examples of equilibrium are given, & it is argued that some major institutions of modern society, eg, the state, monetary communities, & language communities, are equilibria. 6 Figures, 29 References. AA
ISSN:0539-0184
1461-7412
DOI:10.1177/053901892031004005