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Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate t...
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| Published in: | Psychological bulletin 2005-01, Vol.131 (1), p.76-97 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a643t-2d78e5e9c293475d6b589ac4d6e4f14d733ee1b6ba45350ae125aabc4290ec7d3 |
| container_end_page | 97 |
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| container_start_page | 76 |
| container_title | Psychological bulletin |
| container_volume | 131 |
| creator | Gillihan, Seth J Farah, Martha J |
| description | Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.76 |
| format | article |
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The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0033-2909</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1939-1455</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.76</identifier><identifier>PMID: 15631554</identifier><identifier>CODEN: PSBUAI</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Washington, DC: American Psychological Association</publisher><subject>Anatomical correlates of behavior ; Behavioral psychophysiology ; Biological and medical sciences ; Brain - anatomy & histology ; Cognition ; Cognition & reasoning ; Cognitive Neuroscience ; Cognitive neurosciences ; Cognitive Processes ; Cognitive processing ; Cognitive Science - methods ; Experimental Psychology ; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology ; Human ; Humans ; Literature reviews ; Magnetic Resonance Imaging ; Neurology ; Neuropsychology ; Neurosciences ; Neurosciences - methods ; Personality. Affectivity ; Psychology ; Psychology, Experimental - methods ; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry ; Psychology. Psychophysiology ; Recognition (Psychology) ; Self ; Self Concept ; Self representation ; Selfrepresentation</subject><ispartof>Psychological bulletin, 2005-01, Vol.131 (1), p.76-97</ispartof><rights>2005 American Psychological Association</rights><rights>2005 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Copyright (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved.</rights><rights>Copyright American Psychological Association Jan 2005</rights><rights>2005, American Psychological Association</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-a643t-2d78e5e9c293475d6b589ac4d6e4f14d733ee1b6ba45350ae125aabc4290ec7d3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-a643t-2d78e5e9c293475d6b589ac4d6e4f14d733ee1b6ba45350ae125aabc4290ec7d3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,4010,27900,27901,27902,30976,30977,33200,33201</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/detail?accno=EJ688526$$DView record in ERIC$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=16422248$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15631554$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Cooper, Harris</contributor><creatorcontrib>Gillihan, Seth J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Farah, Martha J</creatorcontrib><title>Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience</title><title>Psychological bulletin</title><addtitle>Psychol Bull</addtitle><description>Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self.</description><subject>Anatomical correlates of behavior</subject><subject>Behavioral psychophysiology</subject><subject>Biological and medical sciences</subject><subject>Brain - anatomy & histology</subject><subject>Cognition</subject><subject>Cognition & reasoning</subject><subject>Cognitive Neuroscience</subject><subject>Cognitive neurosciences</subject><subject>Cognitive Processes</subject><subject>Cognitive processing</subject><subject>Cognitive Science - methods</subject><subject>Experimental Psychology</subject><subject>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology</subject><subject>Human</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Literature reviews</subject><subject>Magnetic Resonance Imaging</subject><subject>Neurology</subject><subject>Neuropsychology</subject><subject>Neurosciences</subject><subject>Neurosciences - methods</subject><subject>Personality. Affectivity</subject><subject>Psychology</subject><subject>Psychology, Experimental - methods</subject><subject>Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry</subject><subject>Psychology. 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A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience</title><author>Gillihan, Seth J ; Farah, Martha J</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-a643t-2d78e5e9c293475d6b589ac4d6e4f14d733ee1b6ba45350ae125aabc4290ec7d3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Anatomical correlates of behavior</topic><topic>Behavioral psychophysiology</topic><topic>Biological and medical sciences</topic><topic>Brain - anatomy & histology</topic><topic>Cognition</topic><topic>Cognition & reasoning</topic><topic>Cognitive Neuroscience</topic><topic>Cognitive neurosciences</topic><topic>Cognitive Processes</topic><topic>Cognitive processing</topic><topic>Cognitive Science - methods</topic><topic>Experimental Psychology</topic><topic>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. 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Psychophysiology</topic><topic>Recognition (Psychology)</topic><topic>Self</topic><topic>Self Concept</topic><topic>Self representation</topic><topic>Selfrepresentation</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Gillihan, Seth J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Farah, Martha J</creatorcontrib><collection>ERIC</collection><collection>ERIC (Ovid)</collection><collection>ERIC</collection><collection>ERIC</collection><collection>ERIC (Legacy Platform)</collection><collection>ERIC( SilverPlatter )</collection><collection>ERIC</collection><collection>ERIC PlusText (Legacy Platform)</collection><collection>Education Resources Information Center (ERIC)</collection><collection>ERIC</collection><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>PsycArticles</collection><collection>ProQuest One Psychology</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><jtitle>Psychological bulletin</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Gillihan, Seth J</au><au>Farah, Martha J</au><au>Cooper, Harris</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><ericid>EJ688526</ericid><atitle>Is Self Special? 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| ispartof | Psychological bulletin, 2005-01, Vol.131 (1), p.76-97 |
| issn | 0033-2909 1939-1455 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_67341835 |
| source | Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ERIC; EBSCOhost APA PsycARTICLES |
| subjects | Anatomical correlates of behavior Behavioral psychophysiology Biological and medical sciences Brain - anatomy & histology Cognition Cognition & reasoning Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive neurosciences Cognitive Processes Cognitive processing Cognitive Science - methods Experimental Psychology Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Human Humans Literature reviews Magnetic Resonance Imaging Neurology Neuropsychology Neurosciences Neurosciences - methods Personality. Affectivity Psychology Psychology, Experimental - methods Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology Recognition (Psychology) Self Self Concept Self representation Selfrepresentation |
| title | Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience |
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