Governing police practice : limits of the new accountability

The advent of public-sector managerialism has brought with it a new principle of police accountability in Western democracies such as Australia and Britain. The new accountability gives emphasis to managerial rather than legal or public-interest standards, favours external oversight combined with se...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The British journal of sociology 1999-06, Vol.50 (2), p.251-270
Main Author: CHAN, J. B. L
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Australia
Criminal sociology. Police. Delinquency. Deviance. Suicide
Evaluation
Governance
Government Regulation
Humans
Management
Models, Organizational
Organizational Case Studies
Organizational Innovation
Police
Police - organization & administration
Police administration
Police corruption
Professional Autonomy
Professional Misconduct
Public Administration
Reforms
Social Responsibility
Sociology
Sociology of law and criminology
Studies
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Summary:The advent of public-sector managerialism has brought with it a new principle of police accountability in Western democracies such as Australia and Britain. The new accountability gives emphasis to managerial rather than legal or public-interest standards, favours external oversight combined with self-regulation rather than centralized control, and promotes risk management rather than rule enforcement. This article makes use of the experience of an Australian police force to show that the new accountability has not been successful in holding police accountable, while elements of the old accountability have re-emerged to dominate public debates. It is argued that in the area of police governance, the neo-liberal state does not necessarily pursue a coherent strategy of 'acting at a distance' (cf. Miller and Rose 1990), partly because of the inability of accountability technologies to deliver substantially the promised policy outcomes and partly because of the sensitivity of its political arm to the public's moral outrage against corruption (cf. Garland 1996).
ISSN:0007-1315
1468-4446
DOI:10.1080/000713199358734