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Representing Causation
The dynamics model , which is based on L. Talmy's (1988) theory of force dynamics , characterizes causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related concepts a...
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Published in: | Journal of experimental psychology. General 2007-02, Vol.136 (1), p.82-111 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | The
dynamics model
, which is based on
L. Talmy's (1988)
theory of
force dynamics
, characterizes causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related concepts and explains the induction of causal relationships from single observations. Support for the model is provided in experiments in which participants categorized 3-D animations of realistically rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. Experiments 1-3 showed that causal judgments are based on several forces, not just one. Experiment 4 demonstrated that people compute the resultant of forces using a qualitative decision rule. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that a dynamics approach extends to the representation of social causation. Implications for the relationship between causation and time are discussed. |
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ISSN: | 0096-3445 1939-2222 |
DOI: | 10.1037/0096-3445.136.1.82 |