Genetic testing, adverse selection, and the demand for life insurance

The dramatic increase in genetic testing for adult‐onset diseases has created a debate regarding whether or not insurance companies should be able to use genetic test results in underwriting. We use data from women who have been tested for the BRCA1 gene mutation along with data from otherwise compa...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of medical genetics 2000-07, Vol.93 (1), p.29-39
Main Authors: Zick, Cathleen D., Smith, Ken R., Mayer, Robert N., Botkin, Jeffery R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adolescent
Adult
adverse selection
Bioethics
BRCA1 testing
Breast Neoplasms - genetics
Demography
Female
Genes, BRCA1
genetic test results
Genetic Testing
Health Status Indicators
Humans
Insurance, Life
life insurance
Middle Aged
Mutation
Socioeconomic Factors
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Summary:The dramatic increase in genetic testing for adult‐onset diseases has created a debate regarding whether or not insurance companies should be able to use genetic test results in underwriting. We use data from women who have been tested for the BRCA1 gene mutation along with data from otherwise comparable untested women to assess the potential for adverse selection in the life insurance market when tested individuals know their genetic test results but insurers do not. Our analyses show that women who test positive for the BRCA1 gene mutation do not capitalize on their informational advantage by purchasing more life insurance than those women who have not undergone genetic testing. Am. J. Med. Genet. 93:29–39, 2000. © 2000 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
ISSN:0148-7299
1096-8628
DOI:10.1002/1096-8628(20000703)93:1<29::AID-AJMG6>3.0.CO;2-K