Predicting Hospital Surge after a Large-Scale Anthrax Attack: A Model-Based Analysis of CDC's Cities Readiness Initiative Prophylaxis Recommendations

• Published in: Medical decision making 2009-07, Vol.29 (4), p.424-437
• Main Authors: Hupert, Nathaniel, Wattson, Daniel, Cuomo, Jason, Hollingsworth, Eric, Neukermans, Kristof, Xiong, Wei
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Anthrax - epidemiology; Anthrax - prevention & control; Bioterrorism; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); Civil Defense; Computer Simulation; Decision Support Techniques; Health Services Accessibility - statistics & numerical data; Hospital Bed Capacity - statistics & numerical data; Humans; Models, Theoretical; Program Development; Program Evaluation; Public Health - statistics & numerical data; Surge Capacity - standards; Surge Capacity - statistics & numerical data; United States - epidemiology
• ISSN: 0272-989X; 1552-681X
• DOI: 10.1177/0272989X09341389

Background . After a major bioterrorism attack, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) calls for dispensing of medical countermeasures to targeted populations within 48 hours. The authors explore how meeting or missing this 48-hour goal after a hypothetical aerosol anthrax attack would affect hospital surge, in light of the multiple uncertainties surrounding anthrax-related illness and response. Design . The authors created a discrete-time state transition computer model representing the dynamic interaction between disease progression of inhalational anthrax and the rate of dispensing of prophylactic antibiotics in an exposed population. Results . A CRI-compliant prophylaxis campaign starting 2 days after exposure would protect from 86% to 87% of exposed individuals from illness (assuming, in the base case, 90% antibiotic effectiveness and a 95% attack rate). Each additional day needed to complete the campaign would result in, on average, 2.4% to 2.9% more hospitalizations in the exposed population; each additional day's delay to initiating prophylaxis beyond 2 days would result in 5.2% to 6.5% additional hospitalizations. These population protection estimates vary roughly proportionally to antibiotic effectiveness but are relatively insensitive to variations in anthrax incubation period. Conclusion . Delays in detecting and initiating response to large-scale, covert aerosol anthrax releases in a major city would render even highly effective CRI-compliant mass prophylaxis campaigns unable to prevent unsustainable levels of surge hospitalizations. Although outcomes may improve with more rapid epidemiological identification of affected subpopulations and increased collaboration across regional public health and hospital systems, these findings support an increased focus on prevention of this public health threat.