Rules, Social Ontology and Collective Identity

Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule‐following behaviour that can be (and often is) out of phase with the pu...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal for the theory of social behaviour 2009-09, Vol.39 (3), p.323-344
Main Author: MARTINS, NUNO
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collective consciousness
Cooperation
critical realism
Game Theory
Group Identity
Identity
Norms
Ontology
Philosophy
Philosophy of history. Social and political philosophy. Philosophy of law
Searle
Sen
Social and political philosophy
Social interaction
social rules
Social theory
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Summary:Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule‐following behaviour that can be (and often is) out of phase with the pursuit of individual goals, due to the existence of a collective identity. However, Sen does not clarify the ontological preconditions for the type of social behaviour he describes. I will argue that Sen's account of collective identity can be best interpreted in the light of John Searle's notion of collective intentionality, while Sen's explanation of rule‐following behavior and agency is best understood using the critical realist transformational model of social activity.
ISSN:0021-8308
1468-5914
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00406.x