Theory and Operational Definitions in Computational Memory Models: A Response to Glenberg and Robertson

Glenberg and Robertson (2000) conducted three experiments to investigate the adequacy of high-dimensional memory models in accounting for the meaningful interpretation of sentences. They conclude that high-dimensional memory models (such as LSA and HAL) are inadequate as theories of meaning. As an a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of memory and language 2000-10, Vol.43 (3), p.402-408
Main Author: Burgess, Curt
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Memory
Psychology
Theory
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Summary:Glenberg and Robertson (2000) conducted three experiments to investigate the adequacy of high-dimensional memory models in accounting for the meaningful interpretation of sentences. They conclude that high-dimensional memory models (such as LSA and HAL) are inadequate as theories of meaning. As an alternative account, they offer an embodied approach to cognition—the indexical hypothesis. In this article, I detail how Glenberg and Robertson have failed to extend to the models they criticize the same considerations that are extended to the humans in their experiments. The model is evaluated without providing appropriate experience for the tests that are conducted. Moreover, testing a representational model (e.g., LSA) for processing considerations is inappropriate and ultimately contributes to what are serious flaws in their interpretation of their experimental results.
ISSN:0749-596X
1096-0821
DOI:10.1006/jmla.2000.2715