The social ontology of intentions

This article addresses the issue of how to develop a theory of interpretation of social action (discourse included) that takes into consideration culture-specific claims about intentions while simultaneously allowing for a pan-human, universal dimension of intentionality. It is argued that to achiev...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Discourse studies 2006-02, Vol.8 (1), p.31-40
Main Author: DURANTI, ALESSANDRO
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aboutness
Action theory
Cross cultural studies
Cross-cultural analysis
Cultural anthropology
Discourse analysis
Intentionality
Intersubjectivity
Language
Linguistic anthropology
Phenomenology
Social action
Social interaction
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Summary:This article addresses the issue of how to develop a theory of interpretation of social action (discourse included) that takes into consideration culture-specific claims about intentions while simultaneously allowing for a pan-human, universal dimension of intentionality. It is argued that to achieve such a goal, it is necessary to agree on a basic definition of intentionality and on the conditions that allow for its investigation. After briefly discussing the limitations of applying an (English-based) 'narrow' notion of intention to the analysis of other languages and cultures, a more general and basic analytic notion of intentionality is proposed, that is, as aboutness (as defined by Husserl). By applying this more general notion of intentionality, we can then examine both the content of intentional acts and the conditions that allow for their study across cultural contexts through 'bracketing'. This is made possible by the social ontology of intentions, which is what enables the analysis of human conduct and its interpretation. Our methods and hypotheses must be evaluated over and against such an existential premise.
ISSN:1461-4456
1461-7080
DOI:10.1177/1461445606059548