Embodied cognition and linguistic comprehension

Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer’s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Studies in history and philosophy of science. Part A 2010-09, Vol.41 (3), p.294-304
Main Author: Weiskopf, Daniel A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Action
Cognition
Cognition & reasoning
Comprehension
Embodied cognition
Embodiment
History of medicine and histology
Humans
Language
Linguistics
Neuroscience
Perception
Representation
Semantics
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer’s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view of language has been challenged by advocates of embodied cognition. Drawing on empirical studies of linguistic comprehension, they have proposed that the language faculty reuses the very representations and processes deployed in perceiving and acting. I review some of the evidence and arguments in favor of the embodied view of language comprehension, and argue that none of it is conclusive. Moreover, the embodied view itself blurs two important distinctions: first, the distinction between linguistic comprehension and its typical consequences; and second, the distinction between representational content and vehicles. Given that these distinctions are well-motivated, we have good reason to reject the embodied view of linguistic understanding.
ISSN:0039-3681
1879-2510
DOI:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.005