The Relative Success of Recognition‐Based Inference in Multichoice Decisions

The utility of an “ecologically rational” recognition‐based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition‐based judgment (the “less‐is‐more...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cognitive science 2008-09, Vol.32 (6), p.1037-1048
Main Authors: McCloy, Rachel, Beaman, C. Philip, Smith, Philip T.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Biological and medical sciences
Cognition. Intelligence
Cognitive Processes
Cues
Decision Making
Decision making. Choice
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Heuristic
Heuristics
Mathematical modeling
Mathematical Models
Problem Solving
Psychology
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Recognition
Recognition (Psychology)
Validation studies
Validity
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Summary:The utility of an “ecologically rational” recognition‐based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition‐based judgment (the “less‐is‐more effect”) is identified for a range of cue validity values. Greater ranges of the less‐is‐more effect occur when participants are asked which is the greatest of m choices (m > 2) than which is the least. Less‐is‐more effects also have greater range for larger values of m. This implies that the classic two‐alternative forced choice task, as studied by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), may not be the most appropriate test case for less‐is‐more effects.
ISSN:0364-0213
1551-6709
DOI:10.1080/03640210802152319