Resolving the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: theory and reality

Pairs of unrelated individuals face a prisoner’s dilemma if cooperation is the best mutual outcome, but each player does best to defect regardless of his partner’s behaviour. Although mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in one‐shot games, cooperative solutions based on recipr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of evolutionary biology 2011-08, Vol.24 (8), p.1628-1639
Main Authors: RAIHANI, N. J., BSHARY, R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Animal behavior
Animals
Behavior, Animal
Biological Evolution
Cooperation
Cooperative Behavior
Evolutionary biology
Game Theory
prisoner’s dilemma
pseudo‐reciprocity
Punishment
reciprocity
Reproducibility of Results
tit‐for‐tat
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Summary:Pairs of unrelated individuals face a prisoner’s dilemma if cooperation is the best mutual outcome, but each player does best to defect regardless of his partner’s behaviour. Although mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in one‐shot games, cooperative solutions based on reciprocity can emerge in iterated games. Among the most prominent theoretical solutions are the so‐called bookkeeping strategies, such as tit‐for‐tat, where individuals copy their partner’s behaviour in the previous round. However, the lack of empirical data conforming to predicted strategies has prompted the suggestion that the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) is neither a useful nor realistic basis for investigating cooperation. Here, we discuss several recent studies where authors have used the IPD framework to interpret their data. We evaluate the validity of their approach and highlight the diversity of proposed solutions. Strategies based on precise accounting are relatively uncommon, perhaps because the full set of assumptions of the IPD model are rarely satisfied. Instead, animals use a diverse array of strategies that apparently promote cooperation, despite the temptation to cheat. These include both positive and negative reciprocity, as well as long‐term mutual investments based on ‘friendships’. Although there are various gaps in these studies that remain to be filled, we argue that in most cases, individuals could theoretically benefit from cheating and that cooperation cannot therefore be explained with the concept of positive pseudo‐reciprocity. We suggest that by incorporating empirical data into the theoretical framework, we may gain fundamental new insights into the evolution of mutual reciprocal investment in nature.
ISSN:1010-061X
1420-9101
DOI:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2011.02307.x