Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function di...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Trends in cognitive sciences 2011-08, Vol.15 (8), p.358-364
Main Authors: Cohen, Michael A, Dennett, Daniel C
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Animals
Biological and medical sciences
Brain - physiology
Brain Mapping
Cognition. Intelligence
Consciousness - physiology
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Humans
Models, Biological
Neurology
Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Theories
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Summary:Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
ISSN:1364-6613
1879-307X
DOI:10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008