Information, Commitment, and War

The authors analyze a bargaining model of war that incorporates both commitment problems due to shifting power and asymmetric information. Four results emerge when both bargaining problems are present. First, in contrast to asymmetric information models, the resolution of uncertainty through fightin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Conflict Resolution 2011-08, Vol.55 (4), p.556-579
Main Authors: Wolford, Scott, Reiter, Dan, Carrubba, Clifford J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Armed conflict
Asymmetric information
Asymmetry
Bargaining
Bargaining power
Commitment
Conflict resolution
Conflict theory
Cost efficiency
Economic models
Hostility
Information asymmetry
International agreements
Modeling
Negotiation
Peace making
Peacetime
Power
Power relations
Termination
Total war
Uncertainty
War
Warfare
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Summary:The authors analyze a bargaining model of war that incorporates both commitment problems due to shifting power and asymmetric information. Four results emerge when both bargaining problems are present. First, in contrast to asymmetric information models, the resolution of uncertainty through fighting can lead to the continuation of war rather than its termination. Second, wars can be less—not more—likely to end in settlement the longer they last. Third, war aims increase over time as a belligerent becomes more confident that its opponent will grow unacceptably strong in the future. Finally, the dynamics that characterize wars in purely asymmetric information or commitment models should exist only when the other factor is absent.
ISSN:0022-0027
1552-8766
DOI:10.1177/0022002710393921