Prime and probability: Causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

• Published in: Consciousness and cognition 2011-12, Vol.20 (4), p.1865-1871
• Main Authors: van der Weiden, Anouk, Aarts, Henk, Ruys, Kirsten I.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Biological and medical sciences; Causal knowledge; Cognition & reasoning; Cognition. Intelligence; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology; Humans; Inference; Learning; Miscellaneous; Outcome priming; Outcome probability; Personal Autonomy; Prediction; Probability; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry; Psychology. Psychophysiology; Psychomotor Performance; Repetition Priming; Self-agency
• ISSN: 1053-8100; 1090-2376
• DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.007

► Experiences of self-agency rely on motor predictions and cognitive inferences. ► We examined how causal knowledge about action–outcome relations interacts with these factors. ► Self-agency over primed and non-primed outcomes was judged after learning action outcome relations. ► Prediction effects only emerged when actions and outcomes were causally related. ► Inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired. Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action–outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.