Modeling social and evolutionary games

• Published in: Studies in history and philosophy of science. Part C, Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences, 2012-03, Vol.43 (1), p.202-208
• Main Author: Potochnik, Angela
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Altruism; Behavioral ecology; Biological Evolution; Biology; Cooperation; Evolutionary ecology; Evolutionary game theory; Game Theory; Genetic Fitness; Humans; Models, Biological; Phenotype; Selection, Genetic; Social Behavior
• ISSN: 1369-8486; 1879-2499
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.10.035

► Classic evolutionary game theory overemphasizes discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. ► Considering game theory’s representational roles highlights neglected areas of overlap. ► This leads to recognition of overlooked evolutionary possibilities. ► This result is valuable for models of the evolution of social behavior. When game theory was introduced to biology, the components of classic game theory models were replaced with elements more befitting evolutionary phenomena. The actions of intelligent agents are replaced by phenotypic traits; utility is replaced by fitness; rational deliberation is replaced by natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this classic conception of comprehensive reapplication is misleading, for it overemphasizes the discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. Explicitly considering the representational roles of evolutionary game theory brings to attention areas of overlap that are often neglected, and so a range of evolutionary possibilities that are often overlooked. The clarifications this analysis provides are well illustrated by—and particularly valuable for—game theoretic treatments of the evolution of social behavior.